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A military deployment is visible and vulnerable.  But, deployments are currently 
planned assuming they can be completed with surprise, or defended from any threat.  
JFAST, the current deployment planning and visualization tool of choice, uses heuristics 
of unknown reliability that yield deployment plans of unknown quality, and ignores 
vulnerability.  We introduce LIFTER, an integer-linear program (ILP) that optimizes a 
time-phased force deployment (TPFDD) by day, by asset cycle, and by TPFDD line 
(individual shipment from an origin to a destination), and ATTACKER, also an ILP, 
representing a smart enemy’s resource-limited interdictions to maximally disrupt 
LIFTER’s subsequently re-optimized TPFDD plan.  LIFTER activates transport assets 
from an allocation list, and yields a complete logistic plan that minimizes disruption 
represented by penalties for early, tardy, late, or dropped shipments, and for under-
utilization of asset capacity.  We use LIFTER to qualitatively assess JFAST heuristic 
plans.  We also link both ILPs in a decomposition-based search for the best deployment 
plan around the worst-case interdiction, given that the actions of deployer and interdictor 
are transparent to both parties.  We explain how JFAST could be embellished with its 
own version of ATTACKER.  A key discovery here is a gauge of the value of 
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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
 
The following is a Time-Phased Force Deployment (TPFDD) lexicon.  Some of 
these terms do not appear in this document, but all of them are essential to decipher 
documentation of seminal TPFDD planning methods. 
 
ACL Allowable Cabin Load: The maximum payload that can be carried on an 
airlift mission.  It may be limited by the maximum takeoff gross weight, 
maximum landing weight, or by the maximum zero fuel weight. 
AK AK: air via strategic (AMC, AMC-contract) aircraft 
ALD Available-to-Load Date: A day, relative to C-day in a time-phased force and deployment data, that unit and nonunit equipment and forces can begin 
loading on an aircraft or ship at the port of embarkation [Jones, 2005] 
AMC  Air Mobility Command: Military command responsible for providing airlift, 
air refueling, special air mission, and aeromedical evacuation for U.S. 
forces. 
B8 Format A specific format for TPFDD data produced by JOPES. 
Breakbulk_mt Ship’s capacity for breakbulk equipment measured in mTons 
Bulk Bulksize: Cargo that is within the usable dimensions of a 436L pallet (104’’ 
x 84’’ x 96’’) and within the height and width requirements established by 
the cargo envelope of a particular model aircraft.  A sub-identifier after 
sTons to further describe the cargo associated with a single Line 
requirement 
BULK_st Aircraft capacity for bulk sized equipment measured in sTonss 
CCC Cargo Category Code: Identifier that describes the type, extent, and 
containerization of cargo 
C-Day Commencement Day: The day on which deployment operations begin 
CONOPS Concept of Operations 
Container_mt Ship’s capacity for containerized equipment measured in mTons 
CONUS Continental United States 
CRAF Civil Reserve Air Fleet 
EAD Earliest Arrival Date: A day, relative to C-day, that is specified by a planner 
as the earliest date when a unit, a resupply shipment, or replacement 
personnel can be accepted at a port of debarkation during a deployment.  
[Jones, 2005]. 
ELD Earliest-Load-Date: The day relative to C-Day that a lift asset is available 
for loading [Jones, 2005]. 
ELIST Enhanced Logistics Intratheater Support Tool 
 xiv
GEO Geographic Identifier: A four digit code that identifies a specific location 
JOPES Joint Operations Planning and Execution System 
JSCP Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan 
LAD Latest Arrival Date: A day, relative to C-day, that is specified by a planner 
as the latest date when a unit, a resupply shipment, or replacement personnel 
can arrive and complete unloading at the port of debarkation and support the 
concept of operations [Jones, 2005]. 
Line A TPFDD requirement for transportation 
LOLO Lift-on Lift-off 
Lolo_sqft Ship’s capacity for lift on lift off equipment measured in square feet 
LRWC Long Range Wide-body Cargo:  This term is used to describe cargo aircraft 
utilized from the CRAF fleet. 
LRWP Long Range Wide-bodied Passenger:  This term is used to describe 
passenger aircraft utilized from the CRAF fleet. 
MAX_ACL_lbs The maximum allowable cabin load measured in pounds for cargo carriers 
and passengers for passenger carriers. 
MAX_FUEL_lbs The maximum amount of fuel measured in pounds that can be help by an 
aircraft. 
MAX_TOGW_lbs The maximum takeoff gross weight.  The operating weight plus the fuel 
weight plus the cargo weight measured in pounds.  
MIN_ACL_lbs A percentage of the ACL that must be filled by cargo available at the APOE 
to commit an aircraft to a mission 
MS2POD Mode Source to POD: Two character identifier that relays the mode of 
transportation for a line requirement to its Port of Debarkation 
MSC Military Sealift Command: Military command responsible for providing 
ocean transportation of equipment, fuel, supplies and ammunition to sustain 
U.S. forces worldwide during peacetime and in war for as long as 
operational requirements dictate. 
mTons Measured Tons: a unit of volume equal to 40 cubic feet 
OPER_WT_lbs Operational weight: The operating weight of the aircraft in pounds.  The 
operating weight is the weight of the aircraft less fuel and cargo. 
OPLAN Operational Plan 
Out Outsize: Cargo which exceeds the dimension of oversize (1,090” x 117” x 
105”) and requires the use of a C-5 or a C-17.  A sub-identifier after sTons 
to further describe the cargo associated with a single Line requirement 
OUT_st Aircraft capacity for out sized  equipment measured in sTons 
Over Oversize: Cargo exceeding the usable dimensions of a 436L pallet loaded to 
the design height of 96” but is equal to or less that 1,090” in length, 117” in 
width, and 105” in height.  This cargo is transportable on the C-5, C-17, C-
141, C-130, and to a limited extent the KC-10.  A sub-identifier after sTons 
 xv
to further describe the cargo associated with a single Line requirement 
OVER_st Aircraft capacity for over-sized equipment measured in sTons 
PAX Passengers  
PID Plan Identification: A command-unique four-digit number followed by a suffix indicating the JSCP year for which the plan is written, e.g., "2220-
95."  In JOPES data base, a five-digit number representing the command 
unique four-digit identifier, followed by a one character alphabetic suffix 
indicating the OPLAN option, or a one-digit number numeric value 
indicating the JSCP year for which the plan is written. 
POD Port of Debarkation: The geographic point at which cargo or personnel are 
discharged.  May be a seaport (SPOD) or aerial port (APOD) of debarkation.  
For unit requirements, it may or may not coincide with the destination. 
POE Port of Embarkation:  The geographic point in a routing scheme from which 
cargo or personnel depart.  May be a seaport (SPOE) or aerial port (APOE) 
from which personnel and equipment flow to port of debarkation.  For unit 
and nonunit requirements, it may or may not coincide with the origin. 
POL Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants 
RDD Required Delivery Date:  A date, relative to C-day, when a unit must arrive 
at its destination and complete offloading to properly support the concept of 
operations [Jones, 2005]. 
RLN Requirement Line Number: TPFDD requirement description 
RORO Roll-on Roll-off 
Roro_sqft Ship’s capacity for roll-on roll-off equipment measured in square feet 
SDDC Surface Deployment and Distribution Center: Military command responsible 
fro providing global surface deployment command & control and 
distribution operations to meet National Security objectives in peace 
and war 
SE SE: Sea via MSC ship (common user strategic sealift) 
sqft Square Feet: Two dimensional description of cargo associated with a Line 
Requirement 
sTons Short Tons: a unit measure of weight equivalent to 2000 pounds 
TPFDD Time-Phased Force Deployment Data 
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 xix
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Even though our military logistic deployments are vulnerable to interdiction, we 
plan such deployments without any formal consideration of interdiction threats and 
currently assume we can achieve and maintain military supremacy sufficient to secure 
our movements of personnel and materiel.  Planning a deployment assuming it will be 
invulnerable to interdiction may be current, accepted practice, but this is neither realistic, 
nor safe. 
Surprisingly, there is scant literature on force deployment planning with 
optimization.  Two publications worth noting are a 1999 Naval Postgraduate School 
masters thesis by LT. William Brown, and a 2002 paper by Professors David Morton 
(University of Texas at Austin), Kevin Wood, and Javier Salmeron (both of the Naval 
Postgraduate School).  Brown introduces deterministic re-optimization to respond to 
simulated emergent changes during a deployment, such as denial of debarkation port 
access.  Morton, Wood and Salmeron plan a sealift deployment while hedging against 
potential disruptions by a random attack.  Each publication highlights that current 
logistics planning tools do not anticipate disruptions, and that this can be a key 
deficiency.  Additionally, each paper concentrates on sealift and focuses on major 
adversarial military actions in a two-sided theater engagement.  We are concerned with 
airlift as well as sealift, and the attacks we anticipate include limited insurgent actions.  
We also assume an intelligent enemy will anticipate deployment activities and attack 
optimally with intent to maximize disruption, rather than attack at random. 
We use an “training” time-phased force deployment data TPFDD designed by 
planners at Fort Eustis for a scenario involving approximately half a US Army division to 
deploy from its continental US (CONUS) origins to debarkation points in Azerbaijan and 
Georgia, near the Caspian Sea. 
We assume any debarkation airport or seaport might be vulnerable to an insurgent 
attack, and that such an attack would cause immediate disruption, essentially closing the 
debarkation point while security is restored, and that subsequent debarkation throughput 
would take a few days to fully recover.  We do not conjecture any particular weapon or 
 xx
tactics on the part of the insurgents, reckoning that any breach of security at a debarkation 
point would inflict some disruption.   
To demonstrate how the attacker’s actions can be modeled, we endow the 
insurgents with the will to mount between one and three such attacks over the 
deployment planning horizon, but allow no more than one attack in any five-day period. 
We show how to plan a deployment to anticipate and minimize the worst-case 
consequences of any interdiction.  We develop an integer linear program, LIFTER, for 
optimizing of a deployment, and compare our optimal results with those of Joint Flow 
and Analysis System for Transportation (JFAST), evidently the current planning tool of 
choice for deployment planning.  JFAST plans with what appears to be a fast, rule-based, 
myopic heuristic, but is not a true optimization.  LIFTER employs integer linear 
programming (ILP) to plan an optimal time-phased force deployment by transport mode 
(air and sea); with each TPFDD line (shipment) a homogeneous commodity and cargo 
type (TPFDD level three resolution).  Time fidelity is daily.  The objective is to minimize 
the penalties for early, tardy, or late deliveries, or dropping lines all together, weighted by 
the “importance” (or military worth) of each line. 
We then present ATTACKER, another integer linear program that plans resource-
limited attacks on our deployment intended to maximize disruption, assuming that we 
stay committed to our deployment plan even after the attacks begin.  Given any optimal 
(i.e., minimum disruption penalty) plan from LIFTER, ATTACKER plans a maximally-
disrupting set of interdictions. 
Next, we assume transparency between the deployer and the interdictor --- each 
opponent can see what the other is planning to do, and adjust counter-plans accordingly.  
The Naval Postgraduate School has produced a large body of research in the last few 
years applying optimization to exploit open-source data in red-teaming exercises to 
analyze vulnerability and defense of critical infrastructure.  Their results confirm that the 
statement, “Using public sources openly … it is possible to gather at least 80% of 
information about the enemy,” excerpted from a captured Al Qaeda training manual, is a 
conservative estimate.  Here we apply these results to deployment planning, assuming 
that such a major logistic deployment cannot be hidden. 
 xxi
We find the best deployment plan that responds optimally to the worst that an 
interdictor can do. 
JFAST delivers all but 7% of the general breakbulk (mTons) cargo in our 
uninterdicted TPFDD deployment.  LIFTER delivers all of the cargo on time.  JFAST 
and LIFTER use lift assets at approximately the same rate.  JFAST plans 247 missions to 
satisfy 100% of the air requirements while LIFTER plans 261.  LIFTER plans twice as 
many C-5 missions and one-and-a-half times as many C-17 missions.  For sea delivery 
JFAST schedules 9 ships to move all but 7% of the general breakbulk cargo, with an 
average ship capacity utilization of 85%.  LIFTER schedules nine ships to deliver 100% 
of the sea requirements with an average ship capacity utilization of 57%. 
There are distinguishing differences between JFAST and LIFTER.   
LIFTER delivers an objective assessment of the quality of its plan.  That is, you 
know with certainty how much better any undiscovered plan can be.  JFAST plans are of 
completely unknown quality. 
JFAST is an identity simulation: it features accurate fidelity, and represents 
logistic flows from seminal origins to each end unit in theater.  LIFTER only models the 
strategic lift from embarkation to debarkation points, and approximates time fidelity to 
daily resolution. 
JFAST violates cargo loading restrictions by mixing non-compatible cargo types 
in common compartments, but LIFTER does not. 
JFAST can animate its planned deployment.  But, neither we nor other interested 
researchers have been able to find documentation explaining how JFAST assembles a 
plan.  When JFAST suggests inappropriate or blatantly infeasible plans, we are hard-
pressed to guess why. 
The only way we have found to glean cargo manifests from JFAST is to manually 
click on the moving, animated icon of each lifting asset.   
We cannot reckon how JFAST chooses ships to activate: we have seen JFAST 
ignore available ships and over-use others, or make very late debarkation deliveries. 
 xxii
The ILP ATTACKER, endowed with three attacks for the deployment horizon, 
finds the most-disruptive set of attacks.  ATTACKER achieves its highest rate of success 
by attacking Poti on day C+20 and C+27 and Baku Bina on C+35.  This optimal attack 
plan forces LIFTER to drop 1% of the passenger requirements and 1% of the material 
sTon requirements.  All sea requirements are delivered around this attack plan.  The 
Subsequent analysis yielded similar results when the maximum number of attacks was 
decreased from three to two and then one.  The delays are modest, but the throughput 
penalties are high. 
Our two-sided optimization offers insight into the values of secrecy, deception, 
and intelligence.  We view our first LIFTER plan as a “secret deployment,” with no 
anticipation at all of any interdiction, and our first ATTACKER interdiction as a 
“surprise attack,” made on an unsuspecting deployment.  We then compare these two 
extreme cases with a completely “transparent” pair of deployment and interdiction plans. 
If the deployer anticipates interdiction, and could keep the deployment a complete 
secret, the difference between the military values of the “transparent” case and the 
“secret” one indicates how much this would be worth.  If the interdictor anticipates the 
deployment, and wonders how valuable a deception would be that completely hides the 
threat of interdiction from the deployer, the difference between the military worth of the 
“surprise” case and the “transparent” offers this.  These values of secrecy become the 
goals of intelligence efforts by the respective adversaries. 
We find that if we could deploy with total secrecy, we are marginally penalized 
for a few tardy lines resulting in a value of 1.5 million “importance-day” units (i.e., our 
composite measure of the importance of each line multiplied by the days of tardiness).  If 
the enemy interdicts the TPFDD by surprise with his optimal one attack plan, the impact 
is 520 million “importance-day” units.  The difference between these two numbers 
represents the value of operating secretly, or the value of intelligence. 
Given the speed of the JFAST planner and its features to exclude zones and 
prevent flow to designated regions, implementing a JFAST equivalent of ATTACKER 
should not be too difficult. 
1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Even though a military logistic deployment is visible and vulnerable to 
interdictors, we currently plan such a deployment assuming we can complete it in secrecy 
or defend it from any threat, and we assume that we can achieve and maintain military 
supremacy sufficient to secure our movements of personnel and materiel.  Planning a 
deployment assuming it will be invulnerable to interdiction may be current, accepted 
practice, but this is neither realistic nor safe. 
We show how to plan a deployment to anticipate and minimize the worst-case 
consequences of any interdiction.  Mobilization and deployment of large-scale military 
forces from their home stations to an operational theater is a large logistics problem.  We 
illustrate our new planning technique using a strategic mobilization and deployment of 
several Army units from their home stations within the continental United States to an 
operational theater in Eastern Europe.  The US military uses the Joint Operations 
Planning and Execution System (JOPES) to plan and conduct military operations.  For 
deliberate planning, each theater combatant commander is responsible for preparing an 
approved concept of operations (CONOPS) from the Combined Joint Chiefs of Staff.  
Specific tasking for these CONOPS plans is levied through the Joint Strategic 
Capabilities Plan (JSCP).  During the CONOPS development, a plan database is created 
that represents the forces necessary to conduct the operation.  This database, referred to 
as the Time-Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD), explicitly details the timeline 
necessary to move forces to the theater in accordance with the concept of operations 
[Joint Forces Staff College Pub 1, 2000].  The TPFDD is tested for feasibility using 
various planning aids, including the Joint Flow and Analysis System for Transportation 
(JFAST) [Jones, 2005].  Deployment planners use JFAST to determine transport 
requirements, perform course-of-action analysis, and project delivery profiles of troops 
and equipment by air, land, and sea. 
To the best of our knowledge, JFAST uses an undocumented local search 
heuristics of unknown reliability to suggest a deployment plan of unknown quality.  We 
2 
develop a mathematical optimization of a deployment and compare our optimal results 
with those of JFAST. 
We then model resource-limited attacks of our deployment aimed at maximizing 
disruption, assuming that we stay committed to our deployment plan even after the 
attacks begin. 
Next, we assume transparency between ourselves and the interdictor --- each 
opponent can see what the other is doing, and can thus anticipate and respond to threats 
by re-planning the deployment or interdictions.   
By comparing the results of optimal “surprise interdictions” on a static TPFDD 
deployment with the transparent results, we can gauge the value of secrecy and deception 
to either opponent.  This illustrates a new, quantitative way to evaluate the “value of 
intelligence” in terms understood by both the deployer and the interdictor. 
 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Mathematical optimization has played a key role in planning transportation for 
over a half century.  Koopmans [1946] earned the 1975 Nobel Prize in economics for his 
now-ubiquitous linear programming transportation models.  Surprisingly, there is scant 
literature on TPFDD planning with optimization. 
Brown [1999] uses deterministic re-optimization to respond to simulated 
emergent changes during a deployment.  Brown reveals a shortcoming in the Enhanced 
Logistics Intratheater Support Tool (ELIST), the logistics simulation used in conjunction 
with the warfare simulation THUNDER that interfaces with the Warfighting and 
Logistics Assessment Environment (WLTAE) [JHU APL 2005].  ELIST has no ability to 
reroute supplies to alternate debarkation points in the event of an attack denying access to 
a planned debarkation point.  Brown optimally reschedules ship destinations and arrival 
times in response to such an attack. 
Morton, Wood, and Salmeron [2002] plan a sealift deployment while hedging 
against potential disruptions to a logistics network caused by an attack.  Attacks are 
assumed to follow a probability distribution developed through interpretation of 
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intelligence reporting.  The model is a multi-stage stochastic-program, with recourse. 
This work also highlights the inability of current TPFDD planning tools, specifically 
JFAST, to re-optimize deployment plans given attacks denying access to selected 
facilities. 
Brown [1999] and Morton, et al [2002] focus on sealift.  We are concerned with 
both sealift and airlift.  Their declared goals focus on major adversarial military actions in 
a two-sided theater engagement.  Ours include limited insurgent attacks.  We also assume 
an intelligent enemy will not attack following some probability distribution, but will 
instead attack with intent to maximize disruption. 
 
C. TPFDD DESCRIPTION 
1. Definition 
The TPFDD is a key component of force planning in the Joint Operations 
Planning and Execution System (JOPES) [2000, Joint Force’s Staff College Pub. 1, B-3].  
JOPES is used by national and theater commanders to establish a level of command and 
control necessary for the planning and conduct of joint operations.  JOPES includes all 
the joint operational planning policies, “procedures and reporting structures.”  JOPES is 
used to monitor, plan, and execute mobilization, deployment, employment, and 
sustainment of joint operations [2000, Joint Forces Staff College Pub 1, G-45].  JOPES 
helps build joint operations. 
The TPFDD is: 
The JOPES database portion of an operation plan; it contains time-phased 
force data, non-unit related cargo and personnel data, and movement data 
for the operation plan including (a) in-place units, (b) units to be deployed 
to support the operation plan with a priority indicating the desired 
sequence for their arrival at the port of debarkation,  (c) routing of forces 
to be deployed, (d) movement data associated with deploying forces, (e) 
estimates of non-unit related cargo and personnel movements to be 
conducted concurrently with the deployed forces, and (f) estimates of 
transportation requirements that must be fulfilled by common-user lift 
resources as well as those requirements that can be fulfilled by assigned or 




TPFDD lexicon is acronym-rich and filled with military jargon crucial to 
understanding a deployment.  A deployment moves personnel and equipment from the 
US to some foreign operating area in three phases: 1- mobilization, 2- strategic, and 3- 
theater.  This requires transport assets and infrastructure.  During the mobilization phase 
forces arrive at their origins and prepare to begin the deployment.  The strategic phase of 
a deployment begins with forces moving from their origins to respective sea or air 
embarkation ports (SPOE or APOE), and concludes when these forces arrive at their sea 
or air debarkation ports, SPOD or APOD (see Figures 1 and 2).  Movement of forces to 
their final destination occurs during the theater phase.  The embarkation and debarkation 
points have the key infrastructure needed to support the deployment.  The transport assets 
include heavy transport aircraft and cargo ships (see Figure 3). 
A TPFDD comprises a list of shipment requirements, called “lines.”  Each line 
requirement is either moved by air (denoted “AK”) or by sea (“SE”). 
The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) apportions resources, or assets, to 
combatant commanders based on current military capabilities [Joint Forces Staff College 
Pub 1, 2000].   
A TPFDD represents the time-phasing of the deployment.  Required personnel 
and equipment must arrive in theater synchronously.  Lessons learned from Operations 
Restore Hope in Somalia highlight the disastrous results of equipment arriving at a 
debarkation point without the proper personnel in place to receive it [Allard 1995].  The 
Earliest Arrival Date (EAD), Ready to Load Date (RLD), and Available Load Date 
(ALD), are all critical days in the TPFDD (see Figure 4).  
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Figure 1.  Seaport of Embarkation (SPOE).  Cargo in the marshalling yard is 
positioned for loading on to ships.  Each ship has storage areas, or 
compartments, that are each dedicated to one type of cargo load, including 
some subset of breakbulk; container; lift-on, lift-off (LOLO); roll-on, roll-off 
(RORO); and petroleum, oil and lubricants (POL).  Some ships have their own 
cranes, while others depend on port material handling equipment.  
Compartment capacities for breakbulk and container loads are expressed in 




Figure 2. Airport of Embarkation (APOE).  A cargo chalk (i.e., items designated to 
load on a given aircraft) is a commingled load, so the capacity of the aircraft is 
expressed in terms of total load capacity (maximum load less fuel load for the 








Figure 3.  Clockwise from upper left C-5, C-17, C-141, RORO ship offloading a 
tank, Breakbulk ship (Cape Gibson), and Light Aboard Ship (LASH, similar to 
a civilian container vessel). 
 
The “who and what” are reported in plain text in the TPFDD lines:  The operation 
planners decide who should deploy to execute the mission, and then those designated 
forces take what they need to accomplish their mission.   
 
Figure 4.  TPFDD timing acronyms govern the movement of personnel and materiel 
from origin to theater, and include Ready Load Date (RLD), Available Load 
Date (ALD), Earliest and Latest Arrival Date (EAD, and LAD), and Required 





A TPFDD times movements relative to a commencement day (C-Day) [2002, 
Joint Forces Staff College Pub 1, GL 78]. 
 The TPFDD scenario we use here is comprised of 157 summary (TPFDD level 
two) line requirements.  Each line represents personnel or equipment associated with a 
specific unit to be moved from a particular embarkation location to a particular 
debarkation location in the theater.  Each line can be divided into three portions: (1) 
identifier and timing, (2) location and movement, and (3) associated cargo (by passengers 
or weight).  Using the line called “FALHP” from our scenario, we can divide it into these 
three categories to understand the requirement as reported through JFAST.   
 
PID RLN CCC RLD ALD EAD LAD RDD 
MW011 FALHP PAX 25 26 28 32 45 
Table 1. Identifier and timing acronyms used in the TPFDD. The Plan Identifier (PID) 
associates this line with the specific plan MW011.  The Requirement Line 
Number (RLN) represents an index for the actual line requirement in the TPFDD.  
The cargo category code (CCC) reports the type of cargo the line represents.  The 
timing portion shows the days the line is ready to be handled: Ready to Load Date 
(RLD) is the day the line is ready to begin loading at its Origin.  Available Load 
Date (ALD) is the day when the line is ready for loading at the embarkation point.  
Earliest Arrival Date (EAD) and Latest Arrival Date (LAD) refer to the earliest 
and latest days that a line will be accepted at its debarkation point.  Required 
Delivery Date is the day when the line is expected to be in place in theater to 
support current operations. 
 
Table 1 illustrates the identifier and timing acronyms (column headings), and the 
associated entries for the line denoted “FALHP” in our training TPFDD.  The 
identification portion of “FALHP” shows this line is part of a plan identifier (PID) with 
the name “MW011” and the associated cargo with cargo category code “PAX” or 
passengers (see Table 2).  The timing portion reports all critical days, relative to C-Day, 






Cargo Category Codes 
Type (1st  Character) Extent (2nd Character) Containerization (3rd Character) 
A:  Vehicles Non Self-   
      Deploy 
1: Outsize Unit 
     Equipment 
B:  Can Containerize, 20FT  
      container, 20 STons or less 
B:  Non Self-Deploy     
      Aircraft 
2: Oversized Unit  
     Equipment 
C:  Can Containerize, 40FT  
      container, 30 STons or less 
J:   Other Non Vehicle 
M: Ammunition 
R:  Vehicles Self-        
      Deploy 
3: Bulk Unit 
     Equipment 
D:  Non Containerizable 
Table 2. Three-character Cargo Category Code descriptions for TPFDD lines.  For 
instance, a helicopter is designated “B1D.”  In addition to these materiel codes, 
the code for passengers is “PAX.” 
 
Origin Origin Name MS2POE POE POE NAME MS2POD POD POD Name 
ESGM FT DRUM LH YVGO Wheeler Sack AAF AK AUTS Baku-Bina 
Table 3. Associated cargo, location, and movement fields for the TPFDD.  Origin and 
Origin Name are field identifiers for the GEO code and text name of the starting 
position for a line requirement.   MS2POE indicates the mode source to the port 
of embarkation (POE).  POE and POE NAME are similar to the origin description 
providing the GEO code and text name of the POE.  MS2POD indicates the mode 
source to the port of debarkation (POD).  POD and PODNAME are the GEO code 
and text name of the POD. 
 
The TPFDD line location segment (see Table 3) displays the physical location of 
“FAHLP” from starting location in the “Origin” filed, embarkation point in the “POE” 
filed, and debarkation point in the “POD” filed.  This also shows the means of travel 
between these points.  For example in the mode source to POE (MS2POE) field “LH” 
reveals that “FALHP” is using organic vehicles to get to the POE.  Location data is 
expressed with a four-character geographic identifier (GEO) code and by a text 
description.  The means of movement is expressed by a two-digit movement code (AK 








PAX Bulk mTons Bulk sTons Over mTons Over sTons Out mTons Out sTons Cbbls pol 
129 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Table 4. TPFDD cargo quantities.  A TPFDD line, such as this one for “FALHP”, divides 
commodities into passengers, bulk-, over-, or out-sized cargo, and Petroleum, Oil 
and Lubrication products (POL).  Cargo quantity is given in both measured tons 
(mTons) and short tons (sTons).  Measured tons expresses cargo quantity for 
sealift, and represents a volume equivalent to 40 cubic feet.  Short tons expresses 
cargo quantity for airlift of 2,000 pounds.  Cbbls is hundreds of barrels. 
 
Table 4 illustrates the associated cargo portion of the line “FALHP.”  We see that 
“FALHP” is comprised of 129 passengers. 
A TPFDD line composed of these three components is called “level two,” or 
summary level.  This is the highest level of aggregation for a line requirement.  There is a 
disaggregation of each level two line into one or more level three lines.  Each level three 
line is composed of logistically-homogeneous cargo:  these lines can actually be loaded 
onto transport assets, and thus there is sufficient cargo fidelity to determine a complete 
shipping plan.  Even more detail is visible at higher levels, but we do not need this for our 
work. We use TPFDD level three for modeling movement to the theater.  At level three, 
our scenario TPFDD has 639 lines. 
 
D. JFAST (JOINT FLOW AND ANALYSIS SYSTEM FOR 
TRANSPORTATION) 
The transportation planning tool JFAST (Joint Flow and Analysis System for 
Transportation) has been developed for the US Transportation Command 
(USTRANSCOM) [Jones, 2005] to provide a planner with a graphical user interface that 
illustrates the entire planned deployment.  JFAST supports planning in both the strategic 
and theater phases of a deployment.  Following JOPES planning guidance, the combatant 
commander will consolidate plan inputs and submit the complete plan for review and 
feasibility testing.  As part of that review USTRANSCOM will analyze the strategic sea 
and air transportation feasibility [2000, Joint Forces Staff College Pub 1, 4-15].  JFAST 
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streamlines plan preparation by forecasting and illustrating for the commander what 
USTRANSCOM will do to validate and approve any submitted TPFDD.   
JOPES produces and exports a TPFDD in “B8 format,” [McKinzie and Barnes, 
2004] and this is the only format JFAST accepts.  Once a TPFDD is imported it can be 
viewed and edited in every detail.  A planner can also build a TPFDD from scratch using 
JFAST and then export that plan in B8 format for interoperability with other JOPES 
systems. 
In addition to line requirements, there are fields for each lift asset, origin-
embarkation point, destination-debarkation point, and the C-Day timeline.  Airlift and 
sealift modes each have a separate interface for managing asset attributes.  Lift assets are 
assigned to a plan by either using the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan apportionment 
resident in JFAST or by manual entry.   
POE-POD information comes from Air Mobility Command (AMC) for airports 
and the Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC) for seaports.  Military 
planners coordinate with AMC and SDDC representatives to agree on embarkation and 
debarkation point planning factors.  Once a deployment plan substantially reflects the 
concept of operations, it can be executed and visualized in motion.  The JFAST planner 
can run the deployment in its entirety, or run any of three separate planning spans 
(ORIGIN to POE, air POE to POD, or sea POE to POD).   
For planning in the strategic phase, JFAST decides how to load and move airlift 
and sealift cargo and passengers from each origin to debarkation point.  JFAST 
documentation gives few details about how this movement is planned.  McKinzie and 
Barnes critically analyze JFAST and report that  
All JFAST schedules use only a simple greedy heuristic to generate 
solutions.  JFAST assesses cargo and PAX based on priorities and 
schedules the two from highest priority down.  No process is considered 
that would optimize the scenario. 
This evaluation is echoed by Morton, Wood and Salmeron [2002] who state that JFAST, 
“cannot optimize (or re-optimize) a schedule with respect to an objective such as 
minimize cost.”   
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JFAST plans and schedules both air and sea deployments.  For the air portion 
JFAST allows the user to select one of three models.  Each model produces varying 
levels of fidelity and insight into the deployment.   
The airflow estimator is a capacitated flow model that distributes airlift 
capability across competing movement requirements, by day, with the 
objective of minimizing lateness as compared to the latest arrival date of 
the requirement (2005, JFAST 8.0 Handbook, 3-3B1). 
The “airflow estimator” produces the least fidelity and is recommended for a very 
large TPFDD.  Conversely the “full air scheduler” produces the most fidelity for 
the deployment.   
The full air scheduler converts the air fleet into individual aircraft, 
assigning notional tail numbers to each.  The number of aircraft in 
combination with an aircraft type utilization rate is used to generate a 
flying hour pool, by aircraft type, for each day.  During scheduling, all 
aircraft are evaluated for every mission to determine the aircraft that 
delivers the most cargo within the desired time window.  It is also 
important to note that the full scheduler does not use average load data as 
published in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) mobility annex.  
Instead, the full scheduler performs routing analysis to determine the 
critical leg for each mission.  From the critical leg, a fuel plan is estimated 
and the allowable cabin load (ACL) determined on a mission-by-mission 
basis.  The routing function’s objective is to minimize total mission time.  
(2005, JFAST 8.0 Handbook, 3-3B1).   
The last air model is the “quick scheduler.”  The quick scheduler closely mimics the full 
air scheduler except a flying time estimator is used instead of dynamic routing [Jones, 
2005].  An important difference is that the quick scheduler does not show fuel plan 
management.  Without this visibility, it is impossible to view the available cabin load per 
aircraft.    
The sea model uses one heuristic, optimizing scheduler [Jones, 2005] to produce 
the deployment plan.  Insight to the deployment planned is provided via the sealift 
rainbow chart [Jones, 2005].  The rainbow chart graphically displays the itineraries for 
the ships participating in the deployment.  Additionally the rainbow chart allows the user 
to view cargo manifests for a participating vessel.  
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Once JFAST completes the planning scenario, logistics performance statistics are 
provided through a series of pre-formatted reports or planner-defined ad-hoc reports.  
JFAST uses maps and simulated-time animation to illustrate a deployment.  This 
visualization allows the planner to stop time motion and click on any asset to discover its 
manifest and intentions (see Figure 5).  Unfortunately this is the only way to achieve in-
transit visibility of lines being transported by air assets.   
 
Figure 5.  JFAST deployment playback screen shot.  Aircraft cycles from the US to 
the Azerbaijan theater are animated in simulated time.  There is also a ship 
shown transiting the Strait of Gibraltar.  A mouse-click can stop the animation, 
and drill down to the cargo manifest of any asset in transit.  However, there is 
no means to extract this level three data in a format suitable for analysis. 
 
E. TPFDD SCENARIO 
We use an unclassified “training” TPFDD designed by planners at Fort Eustis for 
a mobility warrant officers’ course that calls for about half of a US Army division to 
deploy from its continental US (CONUS) origins to debarkation points in Azerbaijan and 
Georgia, near the Caspian Sea. 
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Personnel and equipment from four CONUS-based Army forts mobilize and 
move to their associated air and sea embarkation points for deployment (see Figures 6 
and 7).  The summary total volumes of passengers and cargo moved are shown in Table 
5.  
 
 PAX STons MTons 
Air 8,726 3,937       0
Sea     0     0 133,260
Totals 8,726 3,937 133,260
Table 5. Summary of total cargo to be lifted to the theater.  Cargo is reported in passengers 
(PAX), short tons (sTons), and measurement tons (mTons). 
 
 




Figure 7.  Debarkation points in Georgia and Azerbaijan. 
 
F. ATTACKS 
We assume any debarkation point might be vulnerable to an insurgent attack, and 
that such an attack would cause immediate disruption, essentially closing the debarkation 
point while security is restored, and that subsequent POD throughput would take a few 
days to fully recover.  We do not conjecture any particular weapon or tactics on the part 
of the insurgents, reckoning that any breach of security at a debarkation point would 
inflict some disruption.  For example, a kinetic attack with vehicle borne improvised 
explosive devices or short-range rockets would suffice.  Alternately, enemy sympathizers 
might dissuade workers from reporting to POD jobs. 
We also make a key assumption that distinguishes our work from any prior 
TPFDD analysis:  if the US begins moving personnel and materiel by major sealift and 
airlift to conduct operations in a forward area, this will not be done by surprise.  There 
are many recent examples where escalating diplomatic activity and economic sanctions 
have broadcast our intentions prior to military deployment.  Given such prior warning, it 
is not difficult for an enemy to figure out the likely debarkation points. 
Bennett [1997] suggests that an enemy in this situation has no response but to 
seek asymmetric means to throw off the US and buy as much time as possible in hopes to 
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persuade US and international public opinion.  He presents a scenario where forces on the 
verge of war with the US engage in terrorist attacks against airports and seaports, seizing 
initiative and engaging the US before they are able to fight.  Clarke [2005] forecasts the 
future of the war on terror to feature the continued use of low-tech terrorist means to 
achieve maximum public impact.  Such insurgent measures are far easier to mount in a 
foreign country than in US territory. 
We model such attacks to completely stop throughput at an APOD or SPOD for a 
period of time, after which material and personnel handling capabilities incrementally 
regenerate to normal levels over time (see Figure 8).  To demonstrate how the attacker’s 
actions can be modeled, we endow the insurgents with the will to mount a few such 
attacks over the deployment planning horizon, but allow no more than one attack in any 
five-day period.  Because we represent the attacker’s actions by a general integer linear 
program, the fidelity of our attacker model is limited only by our imagination.  
 
Figure 8. Throughput capacity at a debarkation point that is attacked three times 
over the deployment planning horizon.  This figure depicts the effects of three 
attacks spaced no closer to each other than five days, on “C” days 6, 11, and 
25.  Throughput capacity regenerates to 50 percent three days after an attack, 
75 percent a day later, and is back to 100 percent after five days.  Such 
interdiction effect profiles are easy to generalize to suit intelligence estimates 
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 II. OPTIMIZING FORCE DEPLOYMENT TRANSPORT  
A.  TPFDD  
The size of each TPFDD line in our training example varies from a fraction of a 
ton to several hundred tons (see Figure 9).  This is peculiar for a logistics planning model, 
and defies our experience with hundreds of case studies and examples in the military and 
private sectors.  We decided not to follow standard practice rectifying this situation, and 
leave the data intact.  This large diversity of shipment sizes does not bode well for an 
optimization model.  Larger deployments would exacerbate this difficulty. 
Using JFAST TPFDD editor we export level three TPFDD lines to a spreadsheet.  
Each of these level three requirements is categorized into one of nine cargo types based 
on its cargo category code (see Table 6).  The spreadsheet is extracted to a comma-
separated value file for direct use by our algebraic modeling language, General Algebraic 
Modeling System (GAMS) [Brooke, et. Al., 1998].   
We endow our TPFDD with an additional attribute for modeling:  we concoct a 
relative importance for each line in the TPFDD.  This importance is calculated using the 
line attributes: EAD, mode source to POD, cargo category code, sTon weight, and POD.  
Earliest arrival dates for the TPFDD are C+22, C+25, C+28, or C+33.  A line with an 
EAD of C+22 is given a weight of four, an EAD of C+25 receives a weight of three and 
so on.  This places higher importance on cargo in the TPFDD that is desired earlier.   
A TPFDD designated to travel via air (mode source to POD of AK) is given a 
weight of three and a line designated to travel via sea is given a weight of one.  This 
places higher importance on cargo traveling by air.   
The weighting of personnel arriving in theater is a two-step evaluation.  TPFDD 
lines moving passengers are given a weight of two.  This places a priority on personnel 
arriving in theater.  However, if a TPFDD passenger line size is between 26 and 33 
personnel it is given a weight of three.  Based on the TPFDD, the design of this operation 
is very aviation centric.  Aviation maintenance units consist of 26 to 33 personnel per the 
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TPFDD.  Therefore the additional weighting of these lines places higher importance on 
aviation maintenance personnel arriving in theater.   
TPFDD lines debarktion at Sukhmi Drandra airport are given a weight of three, 
Baku Bina a weight of two and Poti a weight of one.  The debarkation point weighting 
continues adding higher importance to air TPFDD lines.   
Finally, the weight (sTons) of each TPFDD line is multiplied by the importance 
factors a line acquires.  The resulting equation takes the form: 
( )l l l ll l EAD MS2POE PAX POE      importance = sTon  weight *weight *weight *weight l∀
 
This line importance score is our surrogate for logistic military value, and we 
assume that the deployer and interdictor both view each line to have this value. 
 
 
Figure 9. Weights of TPFDD lines vary from a few hundred pounds to thousands of 
tons.  While this wide variation may be a necessity for military planning, it 
complicates modeling of such plans.  Most decision support systems for 
logistics planning encourage aggregation of like items, but that is not the 
practice here.  Vertical bars on the x-axis represent individual TPFDD lines.  













Air Cargo Categories Total Cargo per Category 
Bulk sized (sTons)   2,440.9 
Over sized (sTons)  13,569.8 
Out sized (sTons)   19,595.9 
Sea Cargo Categories  
Breakbulk (mTons)    7,632.0 
Container General (mTons)     165.0 
Container Ammo (mTons)   5,507.0 
Container Vehicles (mTons)   2,461.0 
Vehicles (sqft) 425,970.0 
Non Self-deployable Aircraft (sqft)  96,363.0 
Table 6. Cargo to be moved is classified into nine cargo categories 
 
As stated earlier the training TPFDD is comprised of 639 TPFDD level three 
lines.  After review of the data it is possible to reduce this number for faster model solve 
times.  By sorting the lines according to embarkation point, available-to-load date, 
earliest and latest arrival date, required delivery date, and cargo handling characteristics, 
then combining lines that match in all fields, we can reduce the TPFDD to 32 “TPFDD 
level 2.5” lines.  This aggregation is nearly equivalent to level three, and is easier to 
experiment with. 
 
B. MATHEMATICAL FORMULATION OF LIFTER, AN INTEGER 
LINEAR PROGRAM TO OPTIMIZE TPFDD DELIVERIES 
 
Index Use [~cardinality] 
 
m M∈  transport mode (i.e., air, sea)  [~2] 
l L∈   TPFDD shipment line  [~1,000] 
a A∈   transport asset  [~200] 
d D∈   day (alias δ )  [~80] 
n N∈   node for transport (alias s, t)  [~20] 
( )s l N∈  source node for line l 
( )t l N∈  destination node for line l 
b B∈   type of cargo load burden (e.g., weight, cube, footprint, containers) 
[~20] 
c C∈   type of load compartment (e.g., oversize, breakbulk, RORO) [~10] 
y Y∈   node daily throughput capacity (e.g., passengers, airport standard 
20 
tons, seaport metric tons) [~10] 
 
 
Given Data [units] 
 
limportance  value of line l [value-units] 
, ,e t lθ θ θ  penalties for early, tardy, or late delivery [1/day] 
dθ   penalty for dropping volume [fraction] 
uθ   penalty for empty asset capacity [value-units/b-unit] 
,l bburden  cargo burden b of shipment line l [b-units] 
,a ccapacity  maximum capacity of asset a compartments of type c [c-units] 
,b cstow   cargo burden b that can be loaded into compartment type c  
[b-units/c-unit] 
alifts   maximum number of lifts for asset a [cardinality] 
,l lday day  time window for delivery of line l to node ( )t l  [days] 
, ,n y dthroughput throughput capacity y at node n during day d [y-units/day] 
, ,n b yhandling  node n throughput capacity y required by cargo burden b  
[y-units/b-unit] 
, ,a s tdays  time for asset a to transit from node s to node t [days] 
 
Derived data [units] 
 
,, , , , ,/( )a cl b a c l b b cefficiency burden stow burden≡  fraction asset a compartment type c  
  constitituted by load l cargo burden b [fraction]. 
 
Decision Variables [units] 
 
aACTIVATE  =1 if asset a used [binary] 
, , ,a d s tLIFT  =1 if asset a to depart node s on day d, bound for node t [binary] 
, , , ,a c d s tEMPTY  fraction of asset a capacity type c unused by , , ,a d s tLIFT  [fraction] 
, ,l a dLOAD  fraction of line l loaded on transporter a on day d [fraction] 
lDROP  fraction of line l never delivered [fraction] 
lTARDY  fraction of line l delivered later than earliest delivery [days] 
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1. LIFTER Formulation Discussion 
LIFTER takes a time-phased force deployment data (TPFDD) and plans the 
deployment by transport mode, with each TPFDD line (shipment) a homogeneous 
commodity and cargo type (TPFDD level three resolution).  Time fidelity is daily:  Each 
transport asset departure is scheduled to a nearest day.  A large TPFDD line may have to 
be split across asset departures, while smaller lines are shipped as unit loads.  Delivery of 
each TPFDD line is completed as early as possible within its time window, or a variable 
accounts for any fraction of line volume delivered early (prior to time window), tardy 
(after start of time window), or late (after time window), or what fraction of line volume 
is never delivered at all (dropped):  For any such bad outcome, the objective (L0) 
evaluates a penalty proportionate to the importance of the entire line and the maximal 
fraction-days of deviation.  (L0) also penalizes any unused (empty) capacity on any 
activated asset. 
Each constraint (L1) assures that a TPFDD line is either completely delivered by 
transport assets at some time, or accounts for any volume dropped (never delivered).  
Each constraint (L2) limits the loaded cargo burden for each transport departure to the 
compartment capacity of that transport asset.  (L2s) is used for an asset with segregated 
storage of burden types to make sure that each type of burden capacity is honored (such a 
constraint is used for a sealift asset).  (L2c) is used for an asset with commingled burden 
types to make sure that the total burden capacity is honored (such a constraint is used for 
an airlift asset). 
For each node, day, and burden type, a constraint (L3) limits burden loaded and/or 
unloaded.  (Note: This throughput may be vulnerable to and influenced by interdiction 
actions not shown here.) 
Given some transport asset departure on some day from some source to some 
destination, a packing constraint (L4) precludes any subsequent departure of that asset for 
any location until it can have been recovered to that location. 
A constraint (L5) limits the maximum number of lifts for an activated asset during 
the entire planning horizon. 
Each line has a delivery time window expressed as an earliest and latest delivery 
day.  Within a time window, an earlier delivery is preferred.  If any fraction of a line is 
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delivered before its time window, a constraint (L6e) accounts for the total earliness of 
this in fraction-days.  A constraint (L6t) accounts for any tardy delivery of a line within 
its time window, but not at the start of this window.  If any part of a line is delivered after 
the time window, a constraint (L6l) accounts for the total lateness of this in fraction-days.  
Decision variable domains are given in (L7).  Note that some lines must not be split into 
multiple loads, while others may be.  When a line with multiple cargo burden types is 
split between multiple asset lifts, each lift is allocated some proportion of the line, and 
each cargo type is allocated to that lift in that proportion. 
Variables EARLY, TARDY, LATE, and DROP and the constraints (L1) and (L6) 
that define them are exhibited only for clarity:  In practice, these dependent expressions 
are eliminated, with their influence added to the objective function (L0), (L2) are relaxed 
to an inequality (pack) form, and (L6) are relaxed entirely.  For clarity of exposition, not 
all domain constraints on index use are shown, and elastic features for violating other 
constraints, especially vulnerable throughput capacity constraints (L3), are not shown. 
Although we do not need greater resolution for our scenario, there are two 
embellishments that might appeal elsewhere.   
We can replace the , , ,a d s tLIFT  decision indicating asset a departs on day d from 
node s bound for node t with , , , , ', 'a d s t s tCYCLE  to also keep track of where and when the 
asset returns for a next load.  In our scenario, there is scant difference in transit times 
from any source node to any destination node, so there is no motive to track complete 
asset cycles to and from deliveries. 
We can augment the decision to , ,l a dLOAD  some fraction of line l on asset a for 
departure on day d with a binary , ,l a dASSIGN  variable indicating that some volume has 
been loaded.  This permits, for instance, limiting the number of assets among which any 
given line can be split. 
There are also alternate versions of the control constraints (L4) that may be 
stronger in some applications.  For instance, each pair of terms in (L4) can be isolated in 




C. MATHEMATICAL FORMULATION OF ATTACKER, AN INTEGER 
LINEAR PROGRAM TO MAXIMIZE MINIMUM DISRUPTION FOR AN 
OPTIMIZED TPFDD 
 
In addition to nomenclature of the target ILP LIFTER, we need: 
 
Index Use [~cardinality] 
∂ ∈∆   counts days relative to an attack, i.e. {0,1, 2,3, 4}∂ ∈  
cut  iteration (alias γ ) (also cardinality of diversity cuts) [~1,000] 
 
Given Data [units] 
d,ttarget_importance   day d utilization of destination node t by the best 
 TPFDD plan [value-units] 
, ,d d tdamage +∂  fraction of ,d ttarget_importance +∂  extinguished ∂  
days after an attack on day d at destination t. 
attacks    maximum attacks [cardinality] 
_daily attacks   maximum attacks in any one day [cardinality] 
_ _days between attacks  minimum days between any two attacks [days] 
 
Decision Variables [units] 
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1. ATTACKER Formulation Discussion 
Given some minimum-penalty TPFDD plan from LIFTER as a target, 
ATTACKER finds a maximal-penalty disruption of that TPFDD plan. 
LIFTER and ATTACKER are applied alternately, with each LIFTER solution 
seeking a TPFDD plan revision that overcomes the latest proposed ATTACKER 
disruptions, and each ATTACKER plan seeking some new way to disrupt the best 
TPFDD plan. 
ATTACKER objective (A0) evaluates the damage induced by any attack plan.  
(A1) limits the total number of attacks.  A constraint (A2) limits the attacks in any one 
day.  A constraint (A3) limits the number of days after an attack before another might be 
mounted.  A constraint (A4) is accumulated from each prior ATTACKER plan and forces 
the current plan to differ in at least one detail from that prior plan. 
Although in principle any single attack can inflict simultaneous damage on more 
than one vulnerable destination node that lasts an arbitrarily long time after the attack, for 
exposition here we just use damage∂ , for {0,1,..., 4}∂ ∈  (i.e., we simplify to one kind of 





















III. COMPUTATIONAL RESULTS  
A. JFAST RESULTS (NO INTERDICTION) 
JFAST delivers all air requirements to designated debarkation airports within 
delivery time windows and without shortfall, or dropped lines.  As long as cargo arrives 
in theater within its arrival delivery time window.  JFAST reports it “on time.”  JFAST 
fails to deliver all sea requirements.  No sea requirements arrive in theater late, but there 
is a transportation shortfall (that we call “drop” here) of 7% of the general breakbulk 
cargo, or 553 mTons. 
 
1. JFAST Air plan  
JFAST schedules 247 air missions to satisfy 100% of air requirements (see Table 
7).  Passengers arrive in theater on days C+25 and C+28, while cargo arrives steadily 
from C+34 through C+37 (see Figure 10).  We initially use the full air scheduler to plan 
the deployment, however because there are no en-route airfields specified in our training 
TPFDD, JFAST defaults to the quick scheduler.  Airfield constraints for passengers and 
cargo are activated, thus limiting passenger and cargo throughput to planner-specified 
capacities.  The objective of the quick scheduler, like the full air scheduler, is to minimize 
overall mission time with respect to asset hours.  With the quick scheduler, each aircraft 
has a load capacity remaining after deducting fuel weight for the critical (longest) leg of a 
mission, as well as by actual cabin capacity [Jones 2005].  However, because the quick 
scheduler uses a flying time estimator, available cabin load seen by JFAST is not visible 
to us.   
Determining airport throughput capacities requires coordination between 
operational planners and Air Mobility Command (AMC).  Airport capacities here are 
contrived using New York’s John F. Kennedy airport as an example with data acquired 













C-5 57 4 4 
C-17 17 17 22 
C-141B 123 78 194 
LRWC 30 1 1 
LRWP 30 21 26 
Totals 257 121 247 
Table 7. Aircraft available and used by JFAST.  Apportioned aircraft are available to be 
activated, if needed.  No aircraft is allowed to fly more than three missions during 





Figure 10.  JFAST delivers the passengers and cargo shown to debarkation airports 
from earliest arrival date through the duration of the deployment.  Passengers 
arrive on two different days, while cargo arrives on five days. 
 
 
 PAX Cargo (sTons)
Sukhumi Dandra 14,000 4,911 
Baku-Bina 14,000 4,911 
Totals 28,000 9,822 
Table 8. Daily airport throughput capacities for passengers and cargo are derived from 






2. JFAST Sea plan 
JFAST schedules 9 ships, each conducting one mission, to move all but 7% (553 
mTons) of the general breakbulk cargo with an average ship capacity utilization of 85% 
(see Figure 11 and Table 9).  Cargo arrives at Poti starting on the earliest arrival date for 
sea requirements, C+22, and concludes on C+30 (see Figure 12).   
JFAST drops cargo lines with no apparent reason.  To avoid this, we experiment 
and force JFAST to mix ammunition with other cargo and to containerize all cargo that 
can be containerized.  Independently, JFAST loads non-homogenous cargo within 
shipboard compartments, which is forbidden: we did not force this.  For example, 
requirement “TAJFC_R1D” is an ambulance for a medical support group from Fort 
Bragg.  JFAST loads this as measured tons within a breakbulk compartment, rather than 
in a RORO or LOLO compartment as the TAJFC_R1D cargo category code dictates. 
 
 
Figure 11  JFAST utilization of shipboard capacity for the deployment.  Six of the 
nine ships activated are fully-loaded.  In loading these ships, JFAST has 










 JFAST Ship Compartment Utilization 
 Total Capacity Percent capacity used  
Breakbulk (mTons) 117667  83.75 
Container (MTons)   9847  29.56 
Load On Load Off (Sqft)  78928  55.56 
Roll On Roll Off (Sqft) 291000 100.00 
Table 9. JFAST ship compartment utilization.  Some JFAST loads violate compartment 
cargo class restrictions. 
 
JFAST recognizes a “stow factor” that describes the efficiency with which cargo 
can be loaded into a compartment.  For example, if a cargo compartment has 100 
measured tons of capacity, it can hold 75 measured tons of cargo with stow factor 0.75.   
 We force JFAST to honor a zero tolerance for early arrivals.  The minimum load 
for any vessel in the scenario is set to zero percent of loading capacity.  This conveys that 
that all the cargo in the TPFDD is necessary and we will do whatever it takes to get it to 
the theater.   
 Seaport capacity constraints are conventionally provided by Surface Deployment 
and Distribution Center (SDDC).  For this scenario, debarkation seaport throughput 
capacity is contrived using unclassified data available for Poti Port [Port of Poti, 2005].  
The data available for Poti measures throughput capacity in metric tons which differs 
from the TPFDD that measures sea lines in measured tons, a unit of weight versus a unit 
of volume.  These two varying measures make it difficult to compare JFAST and 
LIFTER.  To reconcile, we do not constrain Poti throughput capacity in JFAST and 





Figure 12.  Measured tons and square feet delivered by JFAST to Poti, Georgia, 
between earliest arrival date and the end of the deployment.  All but 7% (553 
mTons) of general breakbulk cargo is delivered by JFAST. 
 
B. LIFTER RESULTS (NO INTERDICTION) 
We generate LIFTER using GAMS (General Algebraic Modeling System 
[Brooke, et al. 1998]) and solve it with CPLEX 9.0 [ILOG 2003] on a 2 GHz laptop 
computer operating under Windows XP [Microsoft 2005].  The GAMS implementation 
aggressively filters index tuples. 
Table 10 shows the penalties we use. 
 
Early penalty θe    1.0
Tardy penalty θt    0.1
Late penalty  θl    1.0
Drop penalty θd 10,000
Empty space penalty θu   10.0
Table 10. LIFTER penalty values.  There is a large penalty assessed for a dropped 
line. 
 
LIFTER optimization results resemble those of JFAST.  However, LIFTER 
delivers all air and sea requirements to theater on time.  There are no dropped lines and 
no lines arrive late.  Like JFAST, we record when lines arrive and penalize the model for 
lines that arrive before their arrival time window or after this time window.  However, 
unlike JFAST, we record when within the time window each line arrives.  A line that 
arrives within its delivery time window, but not on the first day of this, is considered 
tardy.  By penalizing tardy lines we give LIFTER an incentive to deliver lines on their 
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earliest arrival date.  Empty space on assets is also penalized.  This gives LIFTER an 
incentive to maximize cargo capacity usage of activated assets. 
Although our TPFDD extract does not designate whether a line should be shipped 
as a unit load (i.e., not split up among assets for partial line shipment), we think such a 
designation is desirable to restrict optimized solutions from being too clever about filling 
assets for each lift.  Accordingly, we find what fraction of compatible asset capacity each 
line would occupy, and if a line would occupy no more than a quarter of the smallest 
compatible asset, we designate the line as a unit load.  For our scenario, this rule 
produces the results shown in Table 11. 




to be Split 
Lines Split Split-Line 
Shipments 
Air: AK  81 110 47 247 Disaggregated 
Sea: SE 244 204  5  11 
Air: AK   1  14  13 265 Aggregated 
Sea: SE   3  14  3   9 
Table 11. Unit load and non-unit load shipments.  Unit loads must be shipped in a 
single asset lift, while non-unit loads may be split among asset lifts.  Here we 
define as a unit load any line that occupies less than 25 percent of the smallest 
asset that might carry it.  Surprisingly, even though 204 SE lines are permitted to 
be split, only five are split, four into a pair of loads, and one into three loads.  The 
“level 2.5” aggregation has fewer unit loads, and is only a slight relaxation of the 
639 level three lines. 
 
By resorting to extraordinary cargo-handling measures, we may be able to load or 
unload more than the routine facility capacities, albeit at a high cost, otherwise we may 
choose to make early or late delivery, or drop a load entirely.  LIFTER features a 
mechanism for each of these alternatives, and we specify a penalty per off-load unit 
violation and penalties for early or late delivery, or dropping a load, and let LIFTER 
choose the least painful alternative.  We could also model secondary debarkation points 
and alternate routing of cargo, but our focus here is strategic lift and its vulnerability:  We 
want to discover just how good JFAST deployment plans are, and whether they can be 
made better with or without insurgent threats. 
Our specimen TPFDD consists of 639 line requirements (191 air and 448 sea). 
We solve this seminal problem, but for convenience we also pursue a 32-line aggregate 
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as mentioned in chapter two.  This aggregation necessarily relaxes our “unit load” 
refinement, which we introduce merely to avoid too-clever optimization that might 
distribute a line over many assets.  We utilize this aggregated TPFDD for interdiction 
analysis because it is so trivial to optimize as a integer linear program, but we calibrate 
our aggregate results with the full 639-line specimen.   
 
1. LIFTER Airlift Optimization 
We have conservatively assumed that the cargo capacity of each aircraft is 
reduced by a maximum fuel load at takeoff.  LIFTER computes the available cabin load 
by subtracting the sum of aircraft operational weight and maximum fuel weight from the 
maximum gross takeoff weight.  Load class capacities for bulk, over-size and out-size 
cargo are reduced proportionate to the reduced available cabin load capacity. 
LIFTER airlift optimization delivers 191 lines by activating 119 aircraft from its 
allocation of 257 and scheduling 261 air missions (compare Table 12 with JFAST results 
shown in Table 7).  (Alternately, we can designate active aircraft to verify JFAST 
planning results, but LIFTER’s suggested plan is so close to JFAST that this is hardly 
worth the effort, which would require reverse-engineering JFAST fuel management.) 
LIFTER satisfies 100% of air requirements.  Passengers arrive on days C+25, 
C+28 and C+29 while cargo arrives every other day from C+33 through C+38 (compare 
Figure 13 with Figure 10). 
The LIFTER airlift ILP has 4,000 constraints, 78,000 variables, 20,000 of which 
are binary and generates and solves in about 10 seconds.  Conversely the LIFTER airlift 
ILP with the disaggregated TPFDD has 4,200 constraints, 596,000 variables, 288,000 of 
which are binary, and generates and solves in about 30 seconds.   
Most important, LIFTER gives us a quality guarantee for our plan.  Given the 
data at hand, and all the assumptions explicitly stated in our formulation, we know with 
mathematical certainty that there is no better plan as yet undiscovered.  To the degree that 
our plan resembles that of JFAST, we gain some comfort about the JFAST heuristic plan.  
Given that one of the most important uses of JFAST is to assess lift requirements, and 
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that JFAST offers absolutely no assurance that its plan is as good as can be, this quality 
guarantee is a new and important way to calibrate and evaluate JFAST. 
 
 








C-5 57 3 8 
C-17 17 17 39 
C-141B 123 77 186 
LRWC 30 1 2 
LRWP 30 21 26 
Totals 257 119 261 
Table 12. LIFTER aircraft utilization.  Like JFAST, LIFTER uses all 17 C-17’s, but 
flies more missions with each of them.  LIFTER favors the larger C-5 and C-17 
aircraft more than JFAST.  We can control this, and even force LIFTER to use the 
same aircraft as JFAST. 
 
 
Figure 13. LIFTER passenger and cargo delivery to debarkation airports from earliest 
arrival date through the duration of the deployment.  All passengers arrive in 
theater on two different days, while cargo arrives in theater on three days, 
every other day for a span of 5 days. 
 
2. LIFTER Sealift Optimization 
LIFTER sealift optimization activates nine ships from its allocation of 91 and 
breaks 448 lines into 260 loads to satisfy 100% of the sea requirements (compare Figure 
14 with Figure 11, and Table 13 with Table 9) with an average ship utilization of 57% of 
capacity.  (Alternately, we can designate active ships to verify JFAST planning results, 
but LIFTER’s suggested plan is so close to JFAST that this is hardly worth the effort, 
which would require reverse-engineering JFAST’s violations of cargo category loading 
restrictions into ship compartments.) 
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All cargo is delivered on time and arrives as shown in Figure 15 (compare with 
Figure 12).  LIFTER delivers requirements on days C+22, C+28 and C+29, while JFAST 
delivers a steady stream of cargo on days C+28, C+29 and C+30.  Throughput capacity at 
Poti is unrestricted in the un-interdicted case to allow for comparison with JFAST.   
The LIFTER sealift ILP has 870 constraints, 80,000 variables, 22,000 of which 
are binary, and generates and solves in about 30 seconds.  Conversely the LIFTER sealift 
ILP with the disaggregated TPFDD has 1,300 constraints, 159,000 variables, 83,000 of 
which are binary, and generates and solves in about 2 minutes.  
LIFTER honors a strict loading policy that dictates how each cargo category must 
be loaded into compatible ship compartments (see Figure 16).  This signal restriction 
accounts for what superficially appears to be less than optimal ship utilization by 
LIFTER.  This plan is optimal, and strictly adheres to all cargo category load restrictions 
in ship compartments.   
In reality, cargo designated for the lightly-loaded ships might be transferred to 
other ships by scrupulous violation of load restrictions:  An experienced load master can 
beat a planning model every time by violating such rules.   
Here, each ship must load at exactly one seaport:  in reality, we might have ships 
make more than one loading port call, though this is not preferred practice.   
Paradoxically, this blemish of lightly-loaded ships is an artifact of the small size 


















Figure 14. LIFTER sealift optimization utilization of shipboard capacity.  Two of the 
nine ships activated from the 91 ships allocated are completely full.  This plan 
is optimal, and strictly adheres to all cargo category load restrictions in ship 
compartments.  In reality, cargo designated for the lightly-loaded ships might 
be transferred to other ships by scrupulous violation of load restrictions:  An 
experienced load master can beat an optimization model every time by 
violating such rules.  Here, each ship must load at exactly one seaport:  in 
reality, we might have ships make more than one loading port call, though this 
is not preferred practice.  Paradoxically, this blemish of lightly-loaded ships is 
an artifact of the small size of our TPFDD.  Larger deployments offer more 
degrees of freedom to fill activated ships. 
 
 
 LIFTER Ship Compartment Utilization 
 Total Capacity Percent capacity used  
Breakbulk (mTons) 50,604 24.0 
Container (mTons) 43,969 23.0 
Load On Load Off (Sqft) 661,970 91.0 
Roll On Roll Off (Sqft) 62,301 42.0 
Table 13. LIFTER sealift optimization compartment utilization.  LIFTER strictly 





Figure 15.  LIFTER uninterdicted delivery profile.  Measured tons and square feet of 
cargo delivered to Poti, Georgia, between earliest arrival date and the end of 
the deployment.  100% of sea cargo arrives in theater, on time. 
 
 
Figure 16. LIFTER strict ship loading policy.  LIFTER restricts cargo types that can 
be loaded into ship cargo compartments.  For example, one measured ton of 
container ammunition occupies twice as much container storage capacity on a 
ship.  This reflects the manner in which ammunition must be safely handled 
and stowed. 
 
C. LIFTER RESULTS WITH ATTACKER (OPTIMAL INTERDICTION) 
ATTACKER achieves its best three-attack interdiction by targeting Poti on days 
C+20 and C+27, and Baku Bina on day C+35.  This optimal attack forces a small amount 
of air cargo to be dropped:  LIFTER revises air missions, but can’t avoid dropping 1% of 
passengers (53), and 1%, or 27.14 sTons, of materiel.  Despite the throughput damage 
inflicted at the Poti seaport, LIFTER revises deliveries to satisfy 100% of the sea 
requirements anyway.   
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1. LIFTER Airlift Optimization Responding to the Best Three-Attack 
Interdiction 
Here we have a case where extraordinary cargo handling measures come into 
play:  As part of the optimal attack, ATTACKER completely extinguishes the nominal 
throughput capacity of Baku Bina on day C+35 and two days hence.  But, Figure 17 
shows cargo still arriving in theater on these days.  In this case the less painful course of 
action is to pay a high surcharge for exceeding throughput capacity (this is perhaps 
interpretable as a surrogate for using an alternate debarkation node at higher cost), rather 
than the even higher penalty of dropping these lines wholesale.  We control this decision 
with our choice of throughput penalties and drop penalties. 
 
 
Figure 17. Air cargo delivery profile suggested by LIFTER, responding to an attack 
on Baku Bina on day C+35.  LIFTER chooses to pay the per-sTon penalty of 
20,000 units instead of dropping the line for a one-time penalty of 10,000.   
 
ATTACKER iterates over distinct attack plans, tracking the revisions of LIFTER, 
and discovering its best attack plan after 47 iterations.  We see that the delivery profile 
remains very similar to the un-interdicted case (compare Figure 17 with Figure 13), albeit 
with much higher penalties 
 
2. LIFTER Sealift Optimization Responding to the Best Three-Attack 
Interdiction 
LIFTER again schedules nine ships with a slightly higher average ship capacity 
utilization of 58% (see Figure 18) to satisfy the sealift requirements. 
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Figure 18. LIFTER ship capacity utilization in response to an optimal three-attack 
plan.  Ship capacity utilization is about the same as in the uninterdicted case. 
 
Given the large capacity at Poti port, LIFTER reschedules cargo delivery to evade 
ATTACKER disruptions (compare Figure 19 to Figure 15).  Cargo arrives in theater on 
days C+23 and steadily on days C+30 through C+32.  This profile completely avoids 
reduced throughput inflicted by ATTACKER. 
 
 
Figure 19.  LIFTER sea cargo revised delivery profile responding to the best three-
attack plan.  Throughput capacity is restricted during days C+20 through C+24 
and during days C+27 through C+31.  Given the large throughput capacity of 
this seaport, LIFTER is able to circumvent adverse effects. 
 
D. VARYING ATTACKER CAPABILITY 
We analyze one- and two-attack interdictions, realizing that an insurgent may not 
be able to mount three attacks over the deployment horizon.  The results are similar for 
these more-restrained attacks:  When ATTACKER chooses an attack on Baku Bina 
airport, LIFTER suggests suffering penalties for capacity throughput violation rather than 
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dropping lines.  So, these revised profiles do not vary much, although their costs increase 
as pushing cargo through damaged facilities gets harder.  Our penalties suggest re-routing 
these aircraft to more-expensive in-theater “pseudo-airfields,” rather than drop their lines.   
When ATTACKER targets the seaport Poti, LIFTER is able to evade either the 
one- or two-attack scenarios (see Figure 20).  LIFTER reschedules delivery dates to work 
around diminished throughput capacity and delivers all requirements for the TPFDD.   
 
 
Figure 20. LIFTER sealift delivery profile revisions in response to one attack on 
C+35 and two attacks on C+28 and C+35. LIFTER shuffles delivery dates to 
satisfy 100% of sea requirements. 
 
 
E. NON-AGGREGATED VERSUS AGGREGATED TPFDD LINES 
Interdiction analysis using the original non-aggregated TPFDD produces similar 
results, even though different attack strategies were formulated by ATTACKER (see 






Optimal Attack Plans for Disaggregated and Aggregated TPFDD lines 
 Disaggregated (639 Lines) Aggregated (32 Lines) 























Table 14. Optimal attack strategies derived from the original, disaggregated TPFDD 
lines, and the nearly-equivalent aggregation of these.  The attack strategies differ 
in detail, but not in effect. 
 
Using either the disaggregated or aggregated TPFDD deployment, ATTACKER 
chooses to target Baku Bina on C+35 as the optimal one-attack plan.  The results of this 
attack with respect to the responding, reoptimized delivery profile, assessed penalties, 
extraordinary cargo handling means, and overall cost of deployment are nearly exact.  
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IV. CONCLUSIONS AND INSIGHTS 
A. SUMMARY 
We seek an optimal deployment plan that minimizes penalties for early, tardy, 
late, or non-delivery of personnel and materiel to the theater --- a truly optimal plan with 
a guarantee that we haven’t overlooked some better one. 
Mimicking current planning practice, we optimally activate assets, load TPFDD 
lines, and plan deliveries.  This is a “secret deployment” that completely ignores any 
insurgent threat. 
We then seek an optimal “surprise insurgent attack” on our optimal “secret 
deployment,” assessing our vulnerability to such a surprise:  We allow the insurgents to 
anticipate our deployment, and schedule attacks on our debarkation points to deny us 
throughput capacity and maximize the same penalties we have planned to minimize. 
Next, we evaluate a transparent, two-sided conflict where the insurgent attacks 
our deployment and we optimally re-plan around the reduced debarkation throughput 
capacity denied us.  The attacker tracks our revisions and modifies his insurgency.  And 
so forth. 
Our goal is to gain insight into deployment planning in a world where “secrets” 
are hard to keep, and a military deployment is almost surely going to be signaled or 
detected long before the bulk of our military forces arrive in theater. 
A captured Al Qaeda training manual (Department of Justice, 2004) advises: 
“Using public sources openly and without resorting to illegal means, it is possible to 
gather at least 80% of information about the enemy.”  We acknowledge this might be 
true, and if it is we want to be able to plan accordingly.   
 
B. JFAST 
JFAST is evidently the current planning tool of choice for evaluating TPFDD 
deployments, and so we have adopted JFAST as our reference standard for evaluating 
any new contribution we suggest.   
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We have received no formal training about JFAST, relying instead on all the 
documentation we can muster. 
As we have used JFAST, we have forwarded questions to a JFAST training point 
of contact at USTRANSCOM, who has graciously responded to our many questions with 
advice and undocumented detail. 
We read documentation carefully, and have the unusual advantage gained by 
mathematical modeling --- if we capture the essence of what JFAST says it’s doing, we 
should be able to mimic similar behavior. 
Overall, our research has evidently substantially reverse-engineered the essence of 
the strategic deployment JFAST function.  However, there are some niggling, essential 
details we cannot recover. 
We had a hard time recovering, e.g., air load manifests, by the only means we 
have been told this can be done:  “animate the deployment, slow things down, and click 
on the aircraft icons.”  This is tedious for hundreds of missions. 
The rainbow chart in the sea model is marginally more convenient.  Through 
either visualization playback, or the sealift rainbow chart, lines loaded on specific assets 
can be reviewed in the JFAST TPFDD editor ONLY via mouse-clicks.  However, the 
viewable lines are TPFDD summary level two reporting.  We need to see level three lines 
loaded on assets.  We also need to export this information directly to, e.g., the tools in 
Microsoft Office [Microsoft Corporation, 2005] for further analysis. 
We develop a military “importance” for each line in the TPFDD.  This importance 
is what LIFTER and ATTACKER both share as the military value of a line reaching the 
theater, early, exactly on time, tardy, late, or not at all.  We cannot recover how JFAST 
prioritizes the cargo it schedules.  We do have access to the line attributes JFAST uses to 
prioritize lines, but the JFAST evaluation method remains a mystery.   
Evidently, JFAST uses a greedy heuristic for scheduling asset cycles.  We 
conclude that this is the case after much experimentation with JFAST, but there is 
evidently no documentation at all about how this scheduling methods works.  We are not 
the only researchers who would like to understand how JFAST works so that we might 
evaluate results or suggest improvements: similar findings are reported by 
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(internationally-renowned, extremely experienced, influential researchers) Morton, Wood 
and Salmeron [2002] and McKinzie and Barnes [2004]. 
We have observed a number of cases where JFAST unexpectedly and 
spectacularly fails.  For instance, JFAST has ignored available ships while over-using 
others.  JFAST “rule-based ship selection criteria” (sic) evidently penalizes ship 
activation in some fashion [Jones, 2005].  JFAST continues using an activated ship to 
make multiple cycles and deliver materiel very late, rather than activate another available 
ship to deliver on time. 
These obvious failures cause us to wonder how many subtle failures have slipped 
by. 
Given that JFAST is used to certify the feasibility of a TPFDD with allocated 
assets (or even to justify the need for more assets), this seems to us to be a striking 
deficiency.  
JFAST use of stow factors [Jones, 2005] refers to a table that is not available to 
all JFAST planners.  Even if this table is not “available,” this information should at least 
be visible for validation of ship load plans.  Lacking this, we are at a loss to explain why 
JFAST violates what we understand to be rules about commingling cargo. 
 
C. LIFTER AND ATTACKER 
LIFTER suggests optimal deployment plans, with explicit, complete 
documentation of all assumptions, controls, and details.  Such documentation makes it 
possible to tune and influence LIFTER plans by objective analysis.  For instance, we can 
carefully trade off dropping a line with making extraordinary efforts to deliver it, despite 
interdicted throughput capacity.  In the un-interdicted case, LIFTER plans our test 
deployment with scant penalties, for lines delivered a little tardy, and assets used with 






D. ADVANTAGES OF OPTIMIZATION, VICE HEURISTICS. 
A distinguishing contribution of this work is that we offer a truly optimal, face-
valid deployment plan, and we also provide an objective assessment of its quality.  That 
is, we clearly state all our assumptions, and then mathematically guarantee that no other 
plan exists that satisfies these and is better than the one we offer.  This has much to 
recommend it, as you immediately discover when JFAST beautifully animates its 
planning solutions produced by its undocumented heuristics that without warning exhibit 
breathtaking errors and oversights.  You hope for such obvious telltales of trouble, 
because there is no other warning that a poor-quality plan has been offered, even when 
much better plans exist. 
 
E. THE VALUE OF INTELLIGENCE 
What is the value of secrecy?  If we can conduct our TPFDD lifts in complete 
secrecy, we can presumably avoid the hazards of insurgents.  In our case, this would 
mean a secret lift incurring a few tardy penalties totaling about 1.5 million “importance-
day” units (i.e., our composite measure of the importance of each line multiplied by the 
days of tardiness).  In this case, our only constraints are imposed by asset and throughput 
availability. 
What is the value of complete surprise for the interdictor?  If insurgents can 
interdict our shipments optimally and by complete surprise, they can inflict penalties 
totaling 520.6 million (see Figure 21). 
The transparent case yield penalties totaling 47 million.  Clearly, the ability to 
hide activities can have orders-of-magnitude impact for both sides in this exchange.  The 
transparent result is the best, worst-case outcome, with both sides endowed with 
omniscience – full visibility of the conflict.  These extreme points (see figure 21) --- total 
secrecy for the deployment, full transparency between opponents, or total surprise for an 
interdiction --- can be used for excursions representing partial secrecy, or partial surprise.  
Whether you pursue these nuances, or not, Figure 21 should give pause to anyone 




Figure 21. The value of secrecy and intelligence.  From left to right, we see the cost 
of the deployment increases with the amount of information an interdictor 
possesses.  Assuming the interdictor has no information and we surprise him 
with our deployment, there are negligible deployment penalties (1.5 million).  
Conversely, if the interdictor has perfect information, and is able to mount a 
surprise attack against us, the deployment penalties are exceedingly, even 
distressingly high (521 million).  The “transparent” result is what we achieve 
by planning in anticipation of an interdiction (48 million).  The optimistic case 
at the left is what we assume by ignoring vulnerability to interdiction, the 
pessimistic case at the right is what might result if this assumption is false.   
 
F.  EMBELLISHMENTS AND GENERALIZATIONS 
It is easy to extend the geographic span of planned shipments beyond the port of 
debarkation into the theater, whether such shipment planning preserves the fidelity of 
discrete lines, or merely represents shipments as gross materiel flows.  Brown [1999] 
shows how to do this, and also shows how to re-route shipments when debarkation 
capacity is diminished for any period of time.  The overland logistics necessary in 
Georgia and Azerbaijan (see Figure 7) would make such diversions daunting.  So, 
although in theory we could model such evasion of insurgent interdictions, in practice we 
have chosen to merely re-schedule around the disruptions at the planned debarkation 
points. 
We have shown how to optimize movement of half a division --- 639 level-three 
TPFDD lines. Do our methods scale up?  The dimensions reported here are for the full 
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allocation of ships and aircraft, and we already include these.  The sea and air models are 
de-coupled.  The size of each grows linearly with the number of lines.  We are 
comfortable scaling this up to emergent deployment of several divisions (i.e., more 
personnel and materiel, but about the same planning horizon).  To accommodate even 
larger, or longer deployment plans, we would abandon the algebraic modeling language 
GAMS and substitute a direct model generator.  In lieu of direct solution of a monolithic 
problem for sea and air, we would employ indirect means (i.e., column generation).  In 
our experience, this effectively removes size limits. 
 
JFAST is a useful tool for “surprise” deployment planning, albeit dependent upon 
local search heuristics that suggest plans of unknown quality.  JFAST is fast enough to be 
used repeatedly in a heuristic decomposition that mimics ours.  Our optimization model 
ATTACKER emulates resource-limited interdiction actions, and this model can be 
heuristically solved with local search.  An essential feature of this attack heuristic that is 
unusual for local search is a filter that guarantees some feature of each successive attack 
differs from all prior ones.  Lacking such a filter, random attacks can be mounted, but this 
is pretty inefficient.  A local, greedy objective suffices in our experiments to deliver 
good-quality attacks in a few iterations pursuing unique attacks.  Each attack, and 
response, offer a candidate “transparent” plan that is tested to see if a new overall best 
incumbent has been discovered.   
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